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INTRODUCTION 
Robo-advisers1 have become an increasingly prominent source of 
investment advice in the financial services industry.2 These robo-
advisers, synonymous with terms such as “digital advisers” and 
“digital advice,” represent a relatively small market share in 
comparison with more traditional investment advisers.3 However, the 
recent proliferation of robo-advisers4 has caught the attention of 
regulatory agencies such as the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(“SEC”) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(“FINRA”).5 The continuing growth of this technology leads the 
world of legal academia to question the regulatory regime currently in 
place by scrutinizing current law and calling for newly renovated 
 
 1. Robo-advisers are “registered investment advisers that use computer algorithms 
to provide investment advisory services online with often limited human interaction.” 
Press Release, SEC, SEC Staff Issues Guidance Update and Investor Bulletin on Robo-
Advisers (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2017-52.html [https://perma.cc/
4QXY-T99A]. Beyond a digital platform and proprietary algorithms, there is substantial 
variation in business models, resulting in a less-than-concrete definition of “robo-adviser.” 
BlackRock, a large financial services firm, points to four distinct differences in levels of 
sophistication across robo-advisers: (1) customization, (2) tax management, (3) human 
intervention/oversight, and (4) type of entity providing digital advice. BLACKROCK, 
DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE: ROBO ADVISORS COME OF AGE 4–5 (2016), 
https://www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-at/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-digital-investment-
advice-september-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/TZN6-SZ57]. 
 2. See Mary Jo White, Chair, SEC, Opening Remarks at the Fintech Forum (Nov. 
14, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/white-opening-remarks-fintech-forum.html 
[https://perma.cc/PYR8-Z8DT] (“The last few years have seen rapid growth in the 
availability and popularity of automated investment advisory programs.”). 
 3. BLACKROCK, supra note 1, at 1 (“While digital advisors represent a very small 
segment relative to more traditional financial advice providers, their recent rapid growth 
suggests a need for a focused analysis of the business and activities of these advisors.”). 
 4. One report predicted that robo-advisers will have $2.2 trillion in assets under 
management (“AUM”) by 2020. TERESA EPPERSON ET AL., A.T. KEARNEY, HYPE VS. 
REALITY: THE COMING WAVES OF “ROBO” ADOPTION 26 (2015), 
http://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/7132014/Hype+vs.+Reality_The+Coming+
Waves+of+Robo+Adoption.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZF7M-MKHF]. 
 5. See DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, NO. 2017-02, GUIDANCE UPDATE: ROBO-
ADVISERS 1 (2017) [hereinafter SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE], https://www.sec.gov/
investment/im-guidance-2017-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/RU3S-N5CM]; FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE 1 (2016), 
http://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf [http://perma.cc/
9M88-7QVC]; Investor Alert: Automated Investment Tools, SEC (May 8, 2015), 
http://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/autolistingtoolshtm.html [https://perma.cc/
GJ95-FCK5]; Investor Bulletin: Robo-Advisers, SEC (Feb. 23, 2017), 
https://www.sec.gov/oiea/investor-alerts-bulletins/ib_robo-advisers.html [http://perma.cc/
8476-AKMQ]. State securities agencies have also opined on the topic. See MASS. SEC. 
DIV., POLICY STATEMENT: ROBO-ADVISERS AND STATE INVESTMENT ADVISER 
REGISTRATION 1 (2016), http://www.sec.state.ma.us/sct/sctpdf/PolicyStatement–Robo-
Advisers-and-State-Investment-Adviser-Registration.pdf [https://perma.cc/E6FP-D4L7]. 
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methodology. The conversation in legal academia surrounding robo-
advisers currently pertains to the legal obligations that robo-advisers 
owe their clients6: whether robo-advisers can or cannot fulfill their 
duties as fiduciaries under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 
(“Advisers Act”).7 As it currently stands, pursuant to SEC guidance, 
robo-advisers are regulated as investment advisers under the Advisers 
Act, thus sparking debate over whether robots can adequately 
perform the fiduciary duties owed to their clients.8 
Notwithstanding the question of whether robots can be 
fiduciaries, there is another discussion of equal importance worth 
considering: the debate as to whether the legal standards governing 
investment advice should be harmonized. In fact, now is an excellent 
time to have that discussion. The SEC has renewed its interest in the 
differing standards of conduct that govern investment advisers and 
broker-dealers.9 
The difference between being regulated as an investment adviser 
or as a broker-dealer is important because the two are held to 
different legal standards in connection with the investment advice 
given. However, the actual differences in their functions are 
negligible. The difference is that investment advisers are held to a 
fiduciary standard, whereas broker-dealers are held to a lower 
 
 6. See generally Megan Ji, Note, Are Robots Good Fiduciaries? Regulating Robo-
Advisors Under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 1543 (2017) 
(arguing that robo-advisers are “structurally capable” of meeting duty of care standards 
required under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 if regulated properly); John 
Lightbourne, Note, Algorithms & Fiduciaries: Existing and Proposed Regulatory 
Approaches to Artificially Intelligent Financial Planners, 67 DUKE L.J. 651 (2017) (arguing 
that robo-advisers can meet a fiduciary standard as currently modeled). 
 7. Investment Advisers Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 847 (codified as amended at 15 
U.S.C. §§	80b-1 to -21 (2012)). 
 8. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 1–2. 
 9. See Jay Clayton, Chairman, SEC, Public Statement: Public Comments from Retail 
Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards of Conduct for Investment Advisers 
and Broker-Dealers (June 1, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/news/public-statement/statement-
chairman-clayton-2017-05-31 [https://perma.cc/38CT-E8JT]. In fact, Chairman Clayton 
specifically asked for public input on the matter: 
Market developments and advances in technology continue to transform the ways 
in which retail investors obtain advice (e.g., robo-advisers, fintech). How do retail 
investors perceive the duties that apply when investment advice is provided in new 
ways, or by new market entrants? Is this perception out of step with the actual 
obligations of these entities and, if so, in what ways? How should these market 
developments and advances in technology affect the Commission’s consideration 
of potential future actions? What steps should the Commission take, if any, to 
address potential confusion or lack of information in these emerging areas? 
Id. 
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standard of advice deemed suitable to the client in the specific 
circumstances.10 Furthermore, investment advisers have continuing 
obligations pertaining to being a fiduciary, while broker-dealers are 
able to insulate themselves from liability by pointing to the suitability 
of the singular trade at that given point in time.11 
The logic for promoting what many have termed a “harmonized” 
or “uniform” standard is straightforward: investment advisers and 
broker-dealers generally perform the same functions and thus should 
be held to the same standards under the law. On the other side of the 
coin is the argument that a uniform standard should not be 
implemented. A prominent line of reasoning against the need for a 
uniform standard is that holding broker-dealers to a lesser standard 
provides more affordable investment services for those who cannot 
afford a registered investment adviser.12 This argument certainly has 
teeth, as it takes into account the economic reality that the availability 
of a lesser degree of personalized investment advice by broker-
dealers may allow a larger number of market participants to receive 
advice.13 However, because robo-advisers have filled the gap for cost-
effective advice—and the SEC has confirmed they are held to the 
higher fiduciary standard14—there is no longer a persuasive need for 
the lower standard given to broker-dealers. Regardless, the discussion 
of whether to have a uniform standard has pervaded the industry for 
well over a decade, resulting in two congressionally mandated 
studies15 and calls for public comment by the SEC.16 
 
 10. See infra Part I. 
 11. See id. 
 12. See Michael Finke & Thomas P. Langdon, The Impact of the Broker-Dealer 
Fiduciary Standard on Financial Advice, J. FIN. PLAN., July 2012, at 28, 29 (“These less 
wealthy clients may be less able to receive much-needed financial advice incidental to the 
sale of commission products if brokers incur increased liability under a fiduciary 
standard.”). 
 13. This argument necessarily depends on the idea that investment advice 
professionals, if held to higher standards, would likely not take on low-to-mid-wealth 
clients because the time spent on the accounts would not be worth the income produced, 
or the income produced is not worth the legal liability from a general standpoint. 
 14. SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 2 (“Robo-advisers, like all registered 
investment advisers, are subject to the substantive and fiduciary obligations of the 
Advisers Act.”); see also 15 U.S.C. §	80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2012) (excluding “any broker or 
dealer” whose advising services are “incidental” to his or her business). 
 15. See generally ANGELA A. HUNG ET AL., LRN-RAND CENTER FOR CORPORATE 
ETHICS, LAW, AND GOVERNANCE, INVESTOR AND INDUSTRY PERSPECTIVES ON 
INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2008), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/
2008/2008-1_randiabdreport.pdf [http://perma.cc/G67N-QQ7V] (reporting the results of 
one congressionally mandated study of uniform standards); SEC, STUDY ON INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS (2011) [hereinafter SECTION 913 STUDY], 
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The wide variety of business models in which robo-advisers and 
their human teammates interact with their clients further exacerbates 
the need for discussion on the matter.17 This portion of the equation 
has not garnered any attention up to this point; however, it should be 
at the forefront. While the SEC has proclaimed robo-advisers as 
investment advisers under the Advisers Act’s regime, the gray area 
when factoring in different business models is striking. Hybrid models 
of robo-advisers18 are increasingly becoming the norm.19 If the 
differing legal standards between investment advisers and broker-
dealers remain, the SEC will likely encounter the enormous obstacle 
of defining certain business models calling for various degrees of 
interaction between robo-adviser and human teammates as either 
investment advisers or broker-dealers. This Comment argues that a 
uniform fiduciary standard is warranted because the accelerated 
proliferation of robo-advisers—specifically, the myriad of potential 
hybrid business models involving these robo-advisers—will provide 
even greater uncertainty to the current regulatory regime. This 
uncertainty will not only frustrate market participants but also 
generate even greater issues for the SEC down the road. 
This Comment proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an 
overview of the legal standards to which investment advisers and 
broker-dealers are held when they give investment advice to clients. 
 
https://www.sec.gov/news/studies/2011/913studyfinal.pdf [http://perma.cc/9PF2-4CLY] 
(reporting the results of another congressionally mandated study of uniform standards). 
 16. See Clayton, supra note 9. Even more recently, the SEC issued a proposed rule on 
its interpretation regarding the standard of conduct for investment advisers. See Proposed 
Commission Interpretation Regarding Standard of Conduct for Investment Advisers; 
Request for Comment on Enhancing Investment Adviser Regulation, 83 Fed. Reg. 21,203 
(proposed May 9, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275). 
 17. See BLACKROCK, supra note 1, at 6 (listing the primary business models for 
advisers working together with digital advisers or digital advising platforms). See generally 
DELOITTE & AVALOQ, EMERGING MODELS OF DIGITAL WEALTH ADVISORY, 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/financial-services/lu-emerging-
models-digital-wealth-advisory-04102017.pdf [https://perma.cc/H2UC-RB9R] (discussing 
digitization trends and evolving business models). 
 18. Discussion of “hybrid models” or “hybrid robo-advisers” throughout this 
Comment is meant to differentiate between what may be called a “pure” robo-adviser, 
consisting of just the algorithm and web-based platform with little to no human 
interaction. By contrast, the hybrid model refers to a commingling of the algorithm and 
human interaction, resulting in a hybrid experience for the end consumer. 
 19. See Barbara A. Friedberg, Growth of Hybrid Robo-Advisors to Outpace Pure 
Robos, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/articles/financial-advisor/100616/
growth-hybrid-roboadvisors-outpace-pure-robos.asp [http://perma.cc/L8ND-W3MR] (last 
updated Feb. 23, 2017) (“A recent study projected that the growth of hybrid human and 
robo-advisors will outpace stand-alone robo-advisors in terms of assets under management 
in the next several years.”). 
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Part II synthesizes years of debate regarding whether the same legal 
standard should govern the two types of investment professionals. 
Part III discusses the recent regulatory activity surrounding robo-
advisers and the legal conversation regarding whether they can be 
fiduciaries under the law. Finally, Part IV analyzes how robo-advisers 
add to the conversation of a uniform standard and concludes that 
regulators would be well advised to harmonize the two standards by 
creating a uniform standard. 
I.  OVERVIEW OF DIFFERENT OBLIGATIONS OWED BY INVESTMENT 
ADVISERS AND BROKER-DEALERS 
The two primary types of professionals that provide investors 
with investment advice and guidance are investment advisers and 
broker-dealers.20 Many investors are unaware that both the substance 
of the work performed and the standards of care owed to clients 
differ between investment advisers and broker-dealers.21 
Furthermore, the SEC itself has recognized that the boundary 
separating the two groups has been blurred throughout the years.22 
The discussion for harmonization—as opposed to the status quo—is 
well storied and oft argued in academia and industry alike.23 The SEC 
recently asked for public comments from interested parties pertaining 
to the harmonization, or lack thereof, of the standards of conduct for 
investment advisers and broker-dealers.24 
 
 20. See Arthur B. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations of Broker-Dealers and Investment 
Advisers, 55 VILL. L. REV. 701, 701 (2010) [hereinafter Laby, Fiduciary Obligations]. 
 21. See Enhancing Investor Protection and the Regulation of Securities Markets: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. 76 (2009) 
(statement of Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, SEC) (“We are studying whether to 
recommend legislation to break down the statutory barriers that require a different 
regulatory regime for investment advisers and broker-dealers, even though the services 
they provide often are virtually identical from the investor’s perspective.”); HUNG ET AL., 
supra note 15, at 112–13 (observing that many investors do not understand “key 
distinctions” between the two investment professionals, including their duties, titles, and 
services offered). 
 22. See Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 20, at 702; see also JAMES HAMILTON, 
SEC REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS AND BROKERS IN THE BRAVE NEW 
WORLD 7 (2008), http://business.cch.com/securitieslaw/news/03-26-08a.pdf [https://perma.cc/
M7TY-D3UT] (“Some investment advisers, for example, may offer services that employ 
computerized trading programs and may take an active, discretionary management role 
over customer accounts. From the retail investor’s prospective [sic], these activities may 
not be obviously distinct from those in which brokers typically engage.”). 
 23. See, e.g., Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 20, at 703 n.10 (citing calls for 
harmonization).  
 24. SEC Chairman Jay Clayton issued a public statement on June 1, 2017, asking for 
public comments pertaining to the two different standards. Chairman Clayton credits the 
“Fiduciary Rule” promulgated by the Department of Labor (“DOL”) and the DOL’s 
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This part first introduces the fiduciary standard to which 
investment advisers are held, along with the standard’s duty of care 
and duty of loyalty components. It then introduces the various 
standards to which broker-dealers are held. It concludes by briefly 
summarizing the differences. 
A. Investment Adviser Fiduciary Duty 
Investment advisers are regulated under the Advisers Act, which 
imposes a fiduciary duty standard on all advisers registered with the 
SEC.25 The Advisers Act defines an “investment adviser” as 
any person who, for compensation, engages in the business of 
advising others, either directly or through publications or 
writings, as to the value of securities or as to the advisability of 
investing in, purchasing, or selling securities, or who, for 
compensation and as part of a regular business, issues or 
promulgates analyses or reports concerning securities .	.	.	.26 
The definition goes on to specifically exclude “any broker or dealer 
whose performance of such services is solely incidental to the conduct 
of his business as a broker or dealer and who receives no special 
compensation therefor.”27 
The Advisers Act was one of six federal statutes enacted in the 
1930s that were designed to address mischievous conduct in the 
securities industry, which was broadly believed to have caused the 
Great Depression.28 The Advisers Act itself was “the last of the New 
Deal securities laws” and “was probably the least considered and the 
least important.”29 The Advisers Act was passed as a companion to 
 
Secretary Acosta for urging the SEC and DOL to “engage constructively as we each 
pursue our ongoing analyses of the standards of conduct applicable to investment advisers 
and broker-dealers when they provide investment advice to retail investors.” Clayton, 
supra note 9. 
 25. 15 U.S.C. §	80b-2(a)(11) (2012). 
 26. Id. In lay terms, “[i]nvestment advisers are financial service professionals or firms 
in the business of providing discretionary advice to client investors on how to allocate 
investment assets.” Ji, supra note 6, at 1546 n.14. 
 27. 15 U.S.C. §	80b-2(a)(11)(C) (2012) (emphasis added); see also Thomas Lee 
Hazen, Stock Broker Fiduciary Duties and the Impact of the Dodd-Frank Act, 15 N.C. 
BANKING INST. 47, 51 (2011). 
 28. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963). The 
other five statutes were the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935, the Trust Indenture Act of 1939, and the 
Investment Company Act of 1940. Id. 
 29. Roberta S. Karmel, The Challenge of Fiduciary Regulation: The Investment 
Advisers Act After Seventy-Five Years, 10 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 405, 406 
(2016). 
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the Investment Company Act,30 the latter initially taking the lion’s 
share of import.31 
Despite the rather innocuous beginning of the Advisers Act, 
courts and the SEC have since expanded the breadth of investment 
advice law.32 Perhaps the single most important case was SEC v. 
Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc.,33 in which the Supreme Court 
read the investment adviser fiduciary duty into the Advisers Act.34 
The Court observed: 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 thus reflects a 
congressional recognition “of the delicate fiduciary nature of an 
investment advisory relationship,” as well as a congressional 
intent to eliminate, or at least to expose, all conflicts of interest 
which might incline an investment adviser—consciously or 
unconsciously—to render advice which was not disinterested.35 
Thus, the investment adviser fiduciary duty was born.36 Although 
there is no explicit mention of a fiduciary duty within the Advisers 
Act,37 the SEC has said, “There is no doubt .	.	. that an investment 
 
 30. Investment Company Act of 1940, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789. The Investment Company 
Act regulates companies that invest and trade in securities, as well as companies that offer 
their own proprietary investment products for sale to the public. Ji, supra note 6, at 1547. 
 31. Both statutes stemmed from a congressional mandate, through the Public Utility 
Company Act of 1935, directing the SEC to conduct a study on investment companies and 
trusts. Id. at 1546–47. This study encouraged the Senate to introduce both the Investment 
Company Act and the Advisers Act. Id. The SEC study itself did not focus on investment 
adviser functions, and, after grueling negotiations pertaining to the Investment Company 
Act, the study’s chief counsel prodded Congress to expedite passage of basic legislation. 
See id. 
 32. See id. at 1548. “Mechanisms used to develop Advisers Act law include, but are 
not limited to, federal court cases, interpretive releases, the SEC’s bully pulpit, no-action 
letters, and enforcement actions.” Id. (citations omitted). The wide-ranging direction of 
where the law can be promulgated results in a lack of clarity where “[t]he law is scattered 
and standards are unclear.” Id. at 1549. 
 33. 375 U.S. 180 (1963). The case dealt with a registered investment adviser engaging 
in conduct called “scalping.” See id. at 181–83. Most importantly, the Court found that the 
practice of scalping violated the antifraud provision, which is found in section 206 of the 
Advisers Act. Id. at 195. 
 34. See id. at 194–95. 
 35. Id. at 191–92. 
 36. See, e.g., Transamerica Mortg. Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 17 (1979) 
(“[T]he [Advisers] Act’s legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended to 
impose enforceable fiduciary obligations.”). 
 37. Furthermore, apart from references that investment advisers owe their clients 
fiduciary obligations in general, the SEC has promulgated no regulations that 
substantively define the standards of care owed by investment advisers to their clients. 17 
C.F.R. §§	275.0–2 to .222–2 (2018). 
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adviser is subject to the federal fiduciary duty .	.	.	.”38 Furthermore, 
the SEC has stated: 
Under the Advisers Act, an adviser is a fiduciary. This fiduciary 
standard applies to the investment adviser’s entire relationship 
with its clients and prospective clients, imposes upon 
investment advisers the “affirmative duty of ‘utmost good faith, 
and full and fair disclosure of all material facts,’ as well as an 
affirmative obligation to ‘employ reasonable care to avoid 
misleading’” their clients and prospective clients.39 
The SEC has also stated: 
The duty is not specifically set forth in the [Advisers] Act, 
established by SEC rules, or a result of a contract between the 
adviser and the client (and thus it cannot be negotiated away). 
Rather, fiduciary duties are imposed on an adviser by operation 
of law because of the nature of the relationship between the 
two parties.40 
Ultimately, however, the SEC has taken the position that clients bear 
the burden of evaluating an adviser’s competence.41 The fiduciary 
duty further encapsulates two broader notions—the duty of care and 
the duty of loyalty—both of which must be adhered to by an 
investment adviser.42 
 
 38. Memorandum from the Inv’r as Purchaser Subcomm. to the Inv’r Advisory 
Comm. 4 (Feb. 15, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/spotlight/invadvcomm/iacmemofiduciaryduty.	
pdf [https://perma.cc/XL5G-AF3T]. For a high-level discussion of the absence of a clear 
definition of “fiduciary,” see Hazen, supra note 27, at 59–60. 
 39. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 36 (quoting Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, 375 U.S. at 191–92); see also Memorandum from the Inv’r as Purchaser Subcomm. 
to the Inv’r Advisory Comm., supra note 38, at 4. 
 40. DIV. OF INV. MGMT., SEC, REGULATION OF INVESTMENT ADVISERS BY THE U.S. 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 23 (2013) [hereinafter SEC STAFF REPORT], 
https://www.sec.gov/about/offices/oia/oia_investman/rplaze-042012.pdf [https://perma.cc/B4PC-
E2B7]. 
 41. Ji, supra note 6, at 1552; see also Investment Advisers: What You Need to Know 
Before Choosing One, SEC (Aug. 7, 2012), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-
publications/investorpubsinvadvisershtm.html [https://perma.cc/G826-L6SP] (“While some 
investment advisers and financial planners have credentials .	.	. no state or federal law 
requires these credentials. .	.	. Before you hire a financial professional, be sure to ask about 
their background. If they have a credential, ask them what it means and what they had to 
do to earn it. Also, find out what organization issued the credential, and then contact the 
organization [to independently verify it].”). 
 42. See, e.g., TAMAR FRANKEL, FIDUCIARY LAW 106–07 (2011); see also SECTION 
913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 22. 
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1.  Duty of Care 
The duty of care, which stems from section 206 of the Advisers 
Act,43 encompasses two specific obligations—suitability and best 
execution.44 Some believe that neither are enforced to a rigorous 
standard.45 The SEC explains the suitability requirement as follows: 
As fiduciaries, investment advisers owe their clients a duty to 
provide only suitable investment advice. This duty generally 
requires an investment adviser to determine that the investment 
advice it gives to a client is suitable for the client, taking into 
consideration the client’s financial situation, investment 
experience, and investment objectives.46 
Interestingly, this “suitability” obligation relies on a rule proposed by 
the SEC in 1994 that was never adopted.47 Although recognizing the 
rule was never implemented, the SEC has stated that the suitability 
obligation does indeed “reflect[] the current obligation of advisers 
under the Act.”48 The inquiry is ultimately based on what is 
“reasonable under the circumstances.”49 Enforcement actions based 
upon suitability grounds are somewhat rare and are seemingly utilized 
only for the most egregious of violations.50 
The second duty of care recognized in the Advisers Act is the 
duty of best execution in selecting a broker-dealer.51 Once again, 
there is no express duty of best execution in the Advisers Act or SEC 
regulations, but the SEC has expressly noted its applicability.52 “Put 
simply, when an investment adviser selects a broker-dealer to execute 
 
 43. See 15 U.S.C. §	80b-6 (2012). 
 44. See Ji, supra note 6, at 1552. 
 45. See id. 
 46. General Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers, SEC (Mar. 11, 
2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/iaregulation/memoia.htm [https://perma.cc/
8BR8-NYXA]; see also Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, 
59 Fed. Reg. 13,464 (proposed Mar. 22, 1994) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275 (2018)) 
(offering a new rule that would “expressly prohibit investment advisers from making 
unsuitable recommendations to clients”). 
 47. See Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, 59 Fed. 
Reg. at 13,464; see also SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 40, at 24. 
 48. SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 40, at 24 n.134 (noting that enforcement actions 
against advisers have been initiated in the past for those providing unsuitable investment 
advice). 
 49. Suitability of Investment Advice Provided by Investment Advisers, 59 Fed. Reg. 
at 13,465. 
 50. See Ji, supra note 6, at 1553 n.68 (listing a handful of SEC enforcement actions 
that have utilized the suitability requirement). 
 51. See SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 28–29. 
 52. See id.  
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the transactions she recommends, she must seek to ensure that the 
client’s total costs are ‘the most favorable under the circumstances.’”53 
Factors to be considered by the investment adviser when choosing a 
broker-dealer include execution capacity, commissions, financial 
responsibility, responsiveness, and value of that firm’s research.54 
Similar to suitability, the SEC does not aggressively pursue 
enforcement actions based on an adviser’s failure to comply with the 
best execution obligation.55 
2.  Duty of Loyalty 
The SEC has also recognized that the fiduciary duty owed to 
clients requires investment advisers to place the interests of their 
clients ahead of their own, which necessitates disclosure or 
elimination of material conflicts of interest.56 Compared to the duty of 
care, the SEC “is far more rigorous in its governance of the 
investment adviser duty of loyalty.”57 In Capital Gains, the Court 
tacitly recognized the unique importance of the duty of loyalty within 
the Advisers Act.58 
Indeed, in enacting the Advisers Act, Congress was “deeply 
concerned about conflicts of interest in the advisory relationship.”59 
Thus, “under Section 206, advisers have an affirmative obligation of 
utmost good faith and full and fair disclosure of all material facts to 
their clients, as well as a duty to avoid misleading them.”60 
The SEC strictly enforces the disclosure requirement by 
disallowing any waiver for conflicted investment advisers in certain 
circumstances.61 The SEC has promulgated specific rules pertaining to 
 
 53. Ji, supra note 6, at 1553. 
 54. See SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 28–29. 
 55. Ji, supra note 6, at 1553. For examples of enforcement actions by the SEC 
regarding best execution issues, see id. at 1553 n.72. 
 56. See SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 22. 
 57. Ji, supra note 6, at 1554. 
 58. See SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 191–92 (1963) 
(stating that Congress enacted the Advisers Act with the intention of addressing conflicted 
investment advisers that could render advice “which was not disinterested”); see also The 
Supreme Court, 1963 Term, 78 HARV. L. REV. 177, 294 (1964) (providing that the Court 
interpreted the Advisers Act “to require full disclosure in any situation in which there is a 
possibility of bias”). 
 59. Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 20, at 729. 
 60. General Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers, supra note 46. 
 61. See Ji, supra note 6, at 1554–55 (“There is no waiver for conflicted investment 
advisers who believe in good faith that, despite the conflict, they still put their clients’ 
interests first; for advisers who take adequate internal precautions to address conflicts; or 
for advisers who never acted upon a conflict.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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disclosures. For instance, upon registering with the SEC, investment 
advisers must file a Form ADV.62 
B. Broker-Dealer Standard 
Broker-dealers are regulated under the Securities Exchange Act 
of 1934 (“Exchange Act”).63 A “broker” is defined as “any person 
engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the 
account of others.”64 Likewise, a “dealer” is defined as “any person 
engaged in the business of buying and selling securities .	.	. for such 
person’s own account through a broker or otherwise.”65 Although the 
SEC has authority over broker-dealers and regulates them through 
the Exchange Act, FINRA promulgates and enforces specific rules 
regarding the obligations owed to investors.66 
Broker-dealers are generally excluded from regulation under the 
Advisers Act;67 thus, “they are not subject to a federal ‘fiduciary’ 
standard of care.”68 The exclusion of broker-dealers from the 
Advisers Act was “a recognition that brokers and dealers commonly 
give a certain amount of advice to their customers in the course of 
their regular business, and that it would be inappropriate to bring 
them within the scope of the Investment Advisers Act” solely because 
 
 62. See 17 C.F.R. §	275.203-1 (2018); see also Ji, supra note 6, at 1555. 
They must update the form annually and more frequently if significant changes 
occur. Part 1 of the Form ADV is primarily for SEC use and is formatted as a 
check-the-box, fill-in-the-blank form. It asks questions regarding an adviser’s 
business, ownership, clients, employees, business practices, and disciplinary past. 
Part 2 of the Form ADV is divided into a brochure (Part 2A) and brochure 
supplement (Part 2B). The brochure has nineteen items. In it, advisers must 
describe, in plain English, much of the information they disclosed in Part 1. 
Finally, the brochure supplement provides information about the professionals 
working with a client’s account. Investment advisers must deliver both the 
brochure and brochure supplement to clients before or at the time investment 
advisers and clients begin their contractual relationship. Afterward, advisers must 
update the documents and provide clients with a summary of material changes 
every year. Including untrue statements in or omitting material facts from any of 
these documents breaches the Section 206 duty of good faith and violates Section 
207 of the Advisers Act. 
Id. at 1555–56. 
 63. See 15 U.S.C. §§	78a–78pp (2012). 
 64. See id. §	78c(a)(4)(A). 
 65. See id. §	78c(a)(5)(A). 
 66. See Ryan K. Bakhtiari, Katrina Boice & Jeffrey S. Majors, The Time for a 
Uniform Fiduciary Duty is Now, 87 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 313, 317 (2013). 
 67. See 15 U.S.C. §	80b-2(a)(11) (2012) (excluding any broker or dealer that satisfies 
two conditions: (1) investment advice is solely incidental to the conduct of business as a 
broker-dealer, and (2) the broker-dealer does not receive any special compensation). 
 68. Bakhtiari et al., supra note 66, at 317. 
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it is part of their business.69 Likewise, investment advisers are 
excluded from the Exchange Act because they do not engage in 
“effecting” securities transactions.70 Thus, they need not register as 
broker-dealers merely because they have discretionary authority to 
place orders and execute transactions.71 
Broker-dealers have other various duties owed to their clients, 
such as a duty of fair dealing, a duty of best execution, suitability 
requirements, and various disclosure requirements.72 The 
combination of SEC and FINRA rules has been said to impose 
“fiduciary-like” rules that are designed to protect customers of 
broker-dealers.73 
Most notably, investment advice given by broker-dealers—if 
incidental and devoid of any special compensation thereof—is held to 
a “suitability” standard of care under FINRA Rule 2111.74 The 
broker-dealer suitability requirement, in contrast to the suitability 
requirement of investment advisers, is expressly set forth via 
regulations.75 FINRA Rule 2111 requires “reasonable diligence” 
when creating a client’s investment profile, including all relevant 
factors to obtain “sufficient information” to make an investment 
recommendation that is suitable for that specific client.76 Any 
recommendations are analyzed for suitability on a case-by-case 
basis.77 Recommendations are not deemed suitable merely because a 
 
 69. Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2, 11 Fed. Reg. 10,996 (Sept. 27, 1946) (to 
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276). 
 70. Investment Advisers; Uniform Registration, Disclosure, and Reporting 
Requirements; Staff Interpretation, 50 Fed. Reg. 49,835, 49,839 (Dec. 5, 1985) (to be 
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 276). 
 71. Id. 
 72. MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, NEWS BULLETIN: A FIDUCIARY DUTY FOR 
BROKER-DEALERS? HOW DODD-FRANK MAY CHANGE THE WAY BROKER-DEALERS 
CONDUCT BUSINESS 1 (2010), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/100719
DoddFrank.	pdf [https://perma.cc/3NCM-BGV3]. 
 73. Melanie L. Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated? 17–18 (Sept. 12, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3028232 [https://perma.cc/F9U2-
WNGN] [hereinafter Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated?]. 
 74. See Rule 2111: Suitability, FINRA (May 1, 2014), http://finra.complinet.com/en/
display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 [https://perma.cc/HT5X-GK3T]. 
 75. Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated?, supra note 73, at 18. 
 76. Rule 2111.04: Customer’s Investment Profile, FINRA (May 1, 2014), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 
[https://perma.cc/HT5X-GK3T]. 
 77. See Rule 2111.05: Components of Suitability Obligations, FINRA (May 1, 2014), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=9859 
[https://perma.cc/HT5X-GK3T]. 
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client consents to or agrees with them.78 Importantly, 
recommendations governed by the suitability rule do not give rise to 
an “ongoing duty to monitor and make subsequent 
recommendations.”79 
Additionally, broker-dealers should only make 
recommendations that are consistent with the customer’s best 
interests.80 This so-called “best interests” standard is built into 
FINRA’s suitability rule. In effect, the directive that a broker-dealer 
only make recommendations that are in the client’s best interests 
serves as a prohibition on a broker “placing his or her interests ahead 
of the customer’s interests.”81 
Unfortunately, this implies “that FINRA’s concept of the best 
interest standard is simply another iteration of the duty of loyalty 
requiring brokers to refrain from self-dealing and unauthorized 
conflicts of interest.”82 Further, the best interests duty does not 
necessarily require the broker-dealer to recommend the least 
expensive investment, so long as the recommendation is suitable and 
the broker-dealer is not placing his or her interests ahead of the 
client’s.83 Cost is simply one of many factors that FINRA deems 
important in the suitability evaluation.84 
Within the best interests duty also lies a best execution duty 
similar to that of an investment adviser.85 Broker-dealers are required 
 
 78. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 12-25 
SUITABILITY: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE ON FINRA’S NEW SUITABILITY RULE 19 n.15 
(2012) [hereinafter FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 12-25], https://www.finra.org/sites/
default/files/NoticeDocument/p126431.pdf [https://perma.cc/J63G-KP9F]. 
 79. FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 12-55 SUITABILITY: 
GUIDANCE ON FINRA’S SUITABILITY RULE 3 (2012), http://www.finra.org/sites/default/
files/NoticeDocument/p197435.pdf [https://perma.cc/GQ9F-5QLP]. This is in direct contrast 
to an investment adviser. 
 80. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 12-25, supra note 78, at 3.  
 81. Id. 
 82. Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated?, supra note 73, at 26. 
 83. See FINRA, REGULATORY NOTICE 12-25, supra note 78, at 4. 
 84. See id. 
 85. See FIN. INDUS. REGULATORY AUTH., REGULATORY NOTICE 15-46, GUIDANCE 
ON BEST EXECUTION OBLIGATIONS IN EQUITY, OPTIONS AND FIXED INCOME 
MARKETS 2 (2015), https://www.finra.org/sites/default/files/notice_doc_file_ref/Notice_
Regulatory_15-46.pdf [https://perma.cc/C4W9-VTSA]. The regulatory notice asserts, 
[A] broker-dealer’s obligation to obtain best execution of a customer’s order in 
any security is based, in part, on the common law agency duty of loyalty, which 
obligates an agent to act exclusively in the principal’s best interest, and also has 
been incorporated explicitly in FINRA rules. As such, any broker-dealer, when 
acting as agent on behalf of a customer in a transaction, is under a duty to exercise 
reasonable care to obtain the most advantageous terms for the customer. 
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to “use reasonable diligence to ascertain the best market for the 
subject security and buy or sell in such market so that the resultant 
price to the customer is as favorable as possible under prevailing 
market conditions.”86 Factors used to determine “reasonable 
diligence” include the “character of the market for the security,” “the 
size and type of transaction,” and “the number of markets checked.”87 
Despite the protection to customers provided by FINRA, some 
commentators believe that the duties of broker-dealers fall short of 
the fiduciary duty that applies to investment advisers.88 
C. Summation of Differences 
Simply put, broker-dealers are held to a standard of suitability, 
while investment advisers are held to a higher fiduciary standard. 
Although not immediately obvious, the standards are significantly 
different in terms of legal obligation and liability. Associate Professor 
Arthur Laby of Rutgers Law School notes, 
The suitability rule requires that a broker-dealer have a 
reasonable basis to believe a recommendation or investment 
strategy is suitable for a customer based on information the 
broker must obtain through reasonable diligence. A fiduciary 
standard is far more exacting. A fiduciary standard is a “best 
interest” standard. Under a fiduciary standard it is not sufficient 
to determine whether advice is suitable, rather the adviser must 
act in the client’s best interest. Fiduciaries are subject to a 
distinctive duty of loyalty, which, absent disclosure, prohibits 
conflicts of interest when the fiduciary’s personal interest 
conflicts with the principal’s interest, and conflicts of duty when 




 86. Rule 5310(a)(1): Best Execution and Interpositioning, FINRA (May 9, 2014), 
http://finra.complinet.com/en/display/display_main.html?rbid=2403&element_id=10455 
[https://perma.cc/7DQ2-BNGB]. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., MORRISON & FOERSTER LLP, supra note 72, at 1 (“While such duties 
and requirements provide some degree of investor protection, they fall short of the 
‘fiduciary’ standards described by the SEC.”); see also Bakhtiari et al., supra note 66, at 
317–18. 
 89. Arthur B. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations: Why Brokers Should 
Be Fiduciaries, 87 WASH. L. REV. 707, 725 (2012) [hereinafter Laby, Selling Advice and 
Creating Expectations] (emphasis added). 
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II.  THE DEBATE SURROUNDING A UNIFORM STANDARD 
Scholars and industry alike have oft written and debated on the 
differences between the standards governing investment advisers and 
broker-dealers. Many recommend a unification, or harmonization, of 
those standards into a so-called uniform, or “unitary,” fiduciary 
standard that all providers of investment advice must follow.90 
This part first introduces a congressionally mandated study, 
spurred by section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”), on whether to 
promulgate a uniform fiduciary standard. Next, it briefly mentions the 
SEC’s recent request for comment on the matter. Finally, this part 
analyzes the arguments presented on the topic. 
A. Section 913 of the Dodd-Frank Act 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, Congress passed the Dodd-
Frank Act, directing the SEC to perform a study on the different 
standards investment advisers and broker-dealers owe their 
respective clients.91 Effectively, Congress punted on the issue and 
“handed the baton to the SEC.”92 Section 913 not only required the 
performance of a study but also gave the SEC explicit rulemaking 
authority in connection with that study.93 Quite simply, Congress gave 
the SEC the authority to rectify any concerns that it had at the end of 
the study regarding the differences in the standards of care to which 
investment advisers and broker-dealers are held concerning 
securities-related investment advice. Therefore, under section 913, 
 
 90. See Barbara Black, How to Improve Retail Investor Protection After the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 59, 59 (2010) 
(arguing for harmonization of the standard of conduct between broker-dealers and 
investment advisers by basing the standards of care and competence on professionalism 
rather than fiduciary standard); Steven D. Irwin, Scott A. Lane & Carolyn W. Mendelson, 
Wasn’t My Broker Always Looking Out for my Best Interests? The Road to Become a 
Fiduciary, 12 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 41, 61 (2009) (“A consistent fiduciary duty standard would 
likely help to increase investor trust.”); Laby, Fiduciary Obligations, supra note 20, at 701–
02 (describing differences between broker-dealer and investment adviser regulation and 
application of fiduciary standard). 
 91. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 7, 12, 15, 18, 22, 31, and 41 
U.S.C.). This massive legislation exceeds eight hundred pages and constitutes “the most 
comprehensive financial regulation ever adopted by Congress” when considering the 
breadth of subjects, activities, and financial institutions to which it extends its reach. 
Hazen, supra note 27, at 47–48. 
 92. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 735. 
 93. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, §	913(f), 124 Stat. 1376, 1827–28 (2010) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §	78o (2012)); see 
also Hazen, supra note 27, at 48. 
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the SEC has the power to require a uniform fiduciary standard for 
both types of investment professionals. 
Complying with the mandate, the SEC issued its findings from 
the study in January 2011.94 The findings contained two principal 
recommendations. First, the SEC recommended consideration of a 
uniform fiduciary standard for both investment advisers and broker-
dealers when providing investment advice to retail customers.95 The 
second recommendation was that all investors should be given the 
same protections regardless of which type of investment professional 
provides them with advice.96 Despite these recommendations, the 
SEC has yet to act definitively, issuing no new rules or regulations on 
this topic.97 
B. The SEC’s Request for Notice and Comment on the Differing 
Standards 
The gravity of this debate, and the more important notion of 
protection for retail investors when it comes to investment advice, is 
not lost on the SEC as a whole. At the behest of the Secretary of 
Labor,98 and in the wake of extreme uncertainty regarding the 
Department of Labor’s (“DOL”) so-called Fiduciary Rule,99 the SEC 
 
 94. See generally SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15 (describing the SEC’s findings 
and recommendations based on the study). 
 95. See id. at ii. Notably, this recommendation explicitly states that the standard 
should be consistent with the current regime applied to investment advisers, which would 
mean a fiduciary standard. See id.  
 96. See id. at 129. 
 97. The overall recommendations of the study were supported by only three of the 
five SEC commissioners, which may help explain why no new rules or regulations have 
been promulgated on this topic. See Kathleen L. Casey & Troy A. Paredes, Comm’rs, 
SEC, Statement Regarding Study on Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Jan. 21, 
2011), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch012211klctap.htm [https://perma.cc/48MS-
NC2N]. Two of the commissioners dissented from the study, proclaiming insufficiencies in 
the analytical and empirical basis in the recommendations made. See id. (“The Study 
should be viewed as a starting point for further research and consideration, rather than as 
forming the primary basis for rulemaking. Before the Commission proposes rules in this 
area, more rigorous analysis - rooted in economics and data - is needed to avoid 
unintended consequences.”). The two dissenting commissioners argued that the study does 
not “fulfill[] the statutory mandate of Section 913 .	.	. to evaluate the ‘effectiveness of 
existing legal or regulatory standards of care.’” Id. 
 98. Alexander Acosta, Deregulators Must Follow the Law, So Regulators Will Too, 
WALL ST. J., May 23, 2017, at A19. For more information on the current Secretary of 
Labor, R. Alexander Acosta, see Secretary of Labor Alexander Acosta, U.S. DEP’T LAB., 
https://www.dol.gov/agencies/osec [https://perma.cc/W36R-2VNF]. 
 99. The Fiduciary Rule comprises both a final rule and various prohibited transaction 
exemptions that were newly adopted or amended at the same time. Definition of the Term 
“Fiduciary”; Conflict of Interest Rule—Retirement Investment Advice, 81 Fed. Reg. 
20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, and 2550). On May 22, 
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issued a statement asking for public comments. The SEC’s goal was to 
“engage constructively” as both the DOL and SEC “pursue [their] 
ongoing analyses of the standards of conduct applicable to investment 
advisers and broker-dealers when they provide investment advice to 
retail investors.”100 While noting that the SEC has been reviewing this 
area for quite some time,101 Chairman Clayton expressed that the time 
spent on this review “illustrate[s] the complexity of the issues as well 
as the fast-changing nature of our markets, including the evolving 
manner in which investment advice is delivered.”102 Chairman 
Clayton specifically recognized robo-advisers and other forms of 
fintech103 as areas to which those responding with comments should 
lend significant focus.104 Comments have been passionate and wide-
ranging.105 
 
2017, the Department of Labor and the Department of the Treasury issued formal non-
enforcement policy statements regarding the Fiduciary Rule. U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, 
FIELD ASSISTANCE BULL. NO. 2017-02, TEMPORARY ENFORCEMENT POLICY ON 
FIDUCIARY DUTY RULE (2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/employers-and-
advisers/guidance/field-assistance-bulletins/2017-02.pdf [https://perma.cc/WQ72-BFJF]; see 
also I.R.S. Announcement 2017-04, 2017-16 C.B. 1106 (Apr. 17, 2017). The Department of 
Labor also issued a guidance document to provide compliance assistance to affected 
parties. See U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, CONFLICT OF INTEREST FAQS (TRANSITION PERIOD) 
(2017), https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/
faqs/coi-transition-period-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/EC4S-LMJQ]. 
For a detailed discussion on the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule and its embattled existence, or 
lack thereof, see Karmel, supra note 29, at 423–25. 
Furthermore, a Presidential Memorandum issued by President Trump directed the 
DOL “to examine the Fiduciary Duty Rule to determine whether it may adversely affect 
the ability of Americans to gain access to retirement information and financial advice.” 
Memorandum on the Fiduciary Duty Rule, 2017 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 95, at 1 (Feb. 
3, 2017). This resulted in yet another delay for the embattled DOL rule. 
As of June 21, 2018, the Fiduciary Rule was put to rest for the time being, as the Fifth 
Circuit issued a mandate vacating the Fiduciary Rule in total. Chamber of Commerce v. 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 2018). In striking down the Fiduciary Rule 
for overstepping the DOL’s authority, the Fifth Circuit reasoned that “[t]he Fiduciary 
Rule .	.	. bears hallmarks of ‘unreasonableness’ under Chevron Step Two and arbitrary and 
capricious exercises of administrative power.” Id.  
 100. Clayton, supra note 9. 
 101. See id. (referencing the Section 913 Study, the RAND Institute study published in 
2008, and a solicitation of data and other information by the SEC in 2013). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Fintech is a portmanteau which combines the words “financial” and “technology” 
to reference innovative and disruptive technology in the financial sector. See Fintech, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fintech.asp [https://perma.cc/FMC7-
4XZ2]. 
 104. Clayton, supra note 9. Clayton explains: 
Market developments and advances in technology continue to transform the ways 
in which retail investors obtain advice (e.g., robo-advisers, fintech). How do retail 
investors perceive the duties that apply when investment advice is provided in new 
ways, or by new market entrants? Is this perception out of step with the actual 
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C. Arguments For and Against a Uniform Standard 
Efforts to unify the standard, and efforts to the contrary, have 
been ongoing for well over a decade. Interested parties to the 
conversation include academics, interest groups, policymakers, and 
industry, all of which have presented several justifications for a 
change.106 
1.  Investor Confusion 
Perhaps the most common justification in support of a uniform 
standard is that investors are simply confused as to the difference in 
roles between investment advisers and broker-dealers.107 This 
confusion was further highlighted in the RAND Institute for Civil 
Justice report from 2008,108 which was commissioned by the SEC in 
order to research the different protections afforded to retail investors 
under the Advisers Act and the Exchange Act.109 Indeed, this report 
became a rallying cry from academia to the Treasury Department for 
 
obligations of these entities and, if so, in what ways? How should these market 
developments and advances in technology affect the Commission’s consideration of 
potential future actions? What steps should the Commission take, if any, to address 
potential confusion or lack of information in these emerging areas? 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 105. Examples of those who have submitted comments are: Senator Elizabeth Warren; 
the Director of Policy Research from Morningstar, Inc.; the Chairman and CEO of The 
Vanguard Group, Inc.; and the Managing Director and Associate General Counsel of the 
Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association. See Public Comments from Retail 
Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards of Conduct for Investment Advisors 
and Broker-Dealers, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/comments/ia-bd-conduct-standards/
iabdconductstandards.htm [https://perma.cc/K477-B7BQ] (last modified July 24, 2018). 
In addition, the comments include someone named Spencer Gould who simply wished to 
say, “Hands off my 401(k) Wall St!” Spencer Gould, Comment to Public Comments from 
Retail Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards of Conduct for Investment 
Advisors and Broker-Dealers, SEC (July 21, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/comments/ia-bd-
conduct-standards/cll4-156542.htm [https://perma.cc/ULL6-4TBT].  
 106. See Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 736. 
 107. See Irwin et al., supra note 90, at 53 (explaining that recent surveys indicated what 
they called “understandable confusion”); Knut Rostad, Strengthen Disclosures by Limiting 
Their Role in the Delivery of Investment and Financial Advice, 30 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 
141, 144–46 (2011) (reviewing studies regarding investor confusion about the difference 
between investment advisers and broker-dealers); Gary A. Varnavides, Note, The Flawed 
State of Broker-Dealer Regulation and the Case for an Authentic Federal Fiduciary 
Standard for Broker-Dealers, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 203, 204 (2011) (“[B]roker-
dealers and investment advisers offer virtually identical services to investors, resulting in 
considerable confusion for both investors and regulators.”). 
 108. See HUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 31. 
 109. For more information about the rule the SEC adopted with regard to the 
Adviser’s Act, see generally Certain Broker-Dealers Deemed Not to Be Investment 
Advisers, 70 Fed. Reg. 20,424 (Apr. 19, 2005) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 275).  
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a uniform standard.110 The SEC warned of the same in the Section 913 
Study, showing that retail customers are plainly confused by the 
differing roles.111 
It is important to note that there is inherent risk in investing, 
regardless of who is advising an investor.112 Indeed, all investments 
have risks associated with them. However, that argument is certainly 
not sufficient to combat the shortcomings of holding investment 
professionals to differing standards. 
2.  Investor Expectations 
Investors may expect that their brokers are held to the same 
standard as investment advisers or any other person in the profession 
of giving investment advice. This expectation may be addressed in the 
fine print of the contract, stating that broker-dealers are not held to a 
fiduciary standard.113 Ultimately, this places the burden upon the 
investors to “parse through legal distinctions to determine whether 
the advice they receive was provided in accordance with their 
expectations.”114 The RAND Report introduced empirical evidence 
to this end, highlighting a TD Ameritrade survey which found that 
sixty percent of respondents believe broker-dealers owe a fiduciary 
duty to their clients.115 
3.  Reasonable Expectations 
Another possible justification is that of reasonable expectations. 
A proponent of this justification, Professor Laby does not believe the 
aforementioned arguments are compelling and do not, in themselves, 
justify a uniform standard.116 However, he puts forth a compelling 
argument that centers around broker-dealers holding themselves out 
to be the same as investment advisers.117 As Laby explains, the 
 
 110. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL 
REGULATORY STRUCTURE 125–26 (2008), https://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-
releases/Documents/Blueprint.pdf [https://perma.cc/AP27-JKZS] (arguing that brokers 
who provide investment advice to retail customers should be held to the same fiduciary 
standard as investment advisers). 
 111. See SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 101. 
 112. See Risk Disclosures, INV. CTR., INC., https://www.investmentctr.com/client/
disclosures/risk-disclosures [https://perma.cc/WB25-F7AS]. 
 113. See HUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 10 (“Unlike the case of investment advisers .	.	. 
broker-dealers are not categorically bound—by statute, regulation, or precedent—to a per 
se rule imposing fiduciary obligations toward clients.”). 
 114. SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 101. 
 115. HUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 31. 
 116. See Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 753. 
 117. See id. at 753–54. 
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implications of heavy advertising and use of titles to connote an 
advisory relationship lead to the creation of reasonable expectations 
that the broker-dealer is the client’s fiduciary.118 This results in 
common law consequences that generally justify broker-dealers being 
held to a fiduciary standard alongside investment advisers.119 The 
argument concludes that, overall, broker-dealers’ “use of 
advertisements and titles, which induce[] customers to obtain advice 
from brokerage firms[,] .	.	. creates a reasonable expectation that 
brokers providing advice are fiduciaries and must act in customers’ 
best interest.”120 
4.  Functional Similarities Despite Inconsistent Standards 
This argument centers around the fact that brokers have 
functionally become investment advisers and, yet, are held to a 
different standard. The most explicit mention of this argument came 
in a 2009 Treasury Department White Paper, which stated that 
“investment advisers and broker-dealers are regulated under different 
statutory and regulatory frameworks, even though the services they 
provide often are virtually identical from a retail investor’s 
perspective.”121 The argument is that “[u]nder a functional approach 
to regulation, two groups of people performing the same function 
should be regulated by the same standard.”122 Critics point out that 
disparate regulatory treatment does not, in itself, qualify as a 
compelling argument for regulatory change.123 
This functional approach argument encapsulates the issue 
presented by robo-advisers. While it is settled that the pure robo-
adviser model is a fiduciary under the Advisers Act, it is the hybrid 
model that is left with uncertainty. Consider the scenario of two 
hybrid business models. Each hybrid model gives partial 
responsibility to the algorithm and partial responsibility to a human 
investment professional. Model 1 has an algorithm churn out 
investment advice adequate for the specific client in question, then 
has a human broker-dealer make the call to the client regarding the 
new investment or strategy. Model 2 is the exact same but utilizes a 
 
 118. See id. 
 119. See id. at 773. 
 120. Id. 
 121. U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: A NEW 
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 71, 
https://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/Documents/FinalReport_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/98J6-
K5CX]. 
 122. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 742. 
 123. See id. at 742–43. 
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human registered investment adviser to make the phone call. The 
distinction between whether the human is an investment adviser or a 
broker-dealer is important. If the exact same conversation takes place 
with a client in both Model 1 and Model 2, the investment advice 
from each conversation is held to a different legal standard. 
Currently, the advice given by Model 1—utilizing a human broker-
dealer—is held to the lower suitability standard. In contrast, the 
advice given by Model 2—utilizing a human investment adviser—is 
held to the higher fiduciary standard. In both scenarios—whether a 
broker-dealer or investment adviser—a human makes a phone call 
and little else. However, the investment advice, rooted only in the 
algorithm’s genius, is held to a more stringent legal standard. 
5.  Ineffective Standards 
Some commentators believe that the suitability standard 
imposed on broker-dealers is simply too weak to protect retail 
investors and that the standard needs strengthening.124 Most, if not all, 
advocates of this approach believe that the fiduciary standard 
imposed upon investment advisers would provide investors with a 
higher standard of protection than the existing suitability standard.125 
While arguable, most would agree that regulation of broker-
dealers under the suitability standard is less demanding than the 
fiduciary standard imposed upon investment advisers. It is a matter of 
degree and circumstance. Ultimately, advocates of a fiduciary 
standard argue the obvious: broker-dealers may recommend an 
investment that is simply suitable and need not be in the client’s best 
interest.126 
Critics of this argument point out what the advocates may be 
overlooking: broker-dealers may be “already subject to significant 
fiduciary-like obligations when acting as more than mere order takers 
for their customers.”127 The argument proceeds that existing broker-
dealer law already accounts for those broker-dealers who are acting 
in the same capacity as an investment adviser.128 However, whether 
the SEC enforces the situation in that way is another ballgame 
altogether. Ultimately, the fact that the standard of care may be lower 
does not in itself prove that the investment advice rendered is of a 
 
 124. See, e.g., id. at 744. 
 125. See id. at 743–44. 
 126. Id. at 744. 
 127. Hazen, supra note 27, at 49; see also Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated?, 
supra note 73, at 17. 
 128. See Hazen, supra note 27, at 48–49. 
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lower quality or not regulated to a sufficient extent. Another critique 
of this argument is simple, yet eloquent: “a higher standard is not 
necessarily a better standard.”129 
6.  Theoretical Economic Benefits 
The sixth argument tracks the economic proposition that a 
fiduciary standard will “benefit investors more than it will cost 
them.”130 Evaluation of that claim necessitates a utilitarian cost-
benefit analysis of gigantic theoretical proportions.131 The Obama 
administration used this theory.132 
The main critique of the investor benefits argument is that the 
claim is simply theoretical and unsubstantiated.133 Due to this 
inherent limitation, it is presumed that a proper “justification will 
have to be based largely on non-economic grounds.”134 Since this 
Comment is not economic in nature, the theory behind the claim is 
beyond its scope. 
III.  ROBO-ADVISERS AND THE CURRENT MAINSTREAM 
NARRATIVE 
This part introduces the overall atmosphere surrounding robo-
advisers, including what they are, recent developments, and the 
current regulatory scheme. This part first provides a background 
regarding what exactly a robo-adviser is and briefly describes certain 
attributes about robo-adviser business models. Next, this part 
presents the latest regulatory scrutiny surrounding robo-advisers. 
Finally, this part synthesizes the current legal discussions about robo-
advisers and their ability to meet the fiduciary standard under the 
Advisers Act. 
 
 129. Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 746 (“If higher 
were always better, then one ought to raise the standard of conduct applicable to brokers 
and advisers to the highest possible level. This makes little sense.”). 
 130. Id. at 746. 
 131. See id. at 746–47. 
 132. This argument was used by the Obama administration to back the DOL’s now-
deceased Fiduciary Rule. “The Obama administration, which proposed the [fiduciary] 
rule, claimed it would save Americans $17 billion a year from conflicted [investment] 
advice.” Alessandra Malito, The Fiduciary Rule Is Officially Dead. What Its Fate Means to 
You, MARKETWATCH (June 25, 2018, 1:55 PM), https://www.marketwatch.com/story/is-the-
fiduciary-rule-dead-or-alive-what-its-fate-means-to-you-2018-03-16 [https://perma.cc/MZ9Q-
U3U8]. 
 133. See Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 748. 
 134. See id. at 749–50. 
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A. Background on Robo-Advisers 
Industry professionals are beginning to recognize that robo-
advice technology has a good chance of “revolutionizing how 
individuals receive investment advice.”135 These “sophisticated 
machine learning algorithms [are utilized] to provide personalized 
investment advice and monitoring 24-7.”136 Simply put, robo-advisers 
are “online services that use algorithms to generate investment 
recommendations for clients.”137 
Due to the absence of human oversight and cost of human 
advice, robo-advisers generally charge significantly lower fees than 
other investment professionals.138 In addition, the robo-adviser 
business model realizes efficiencies beyond just lower fees. Robo-
advisers can actively and accurately perform common advisory 
functions, such as rebalancing and tax-loss harvesting.139 As of the 
beginning of 2017, the total assets under management (“AUM”) of 
the six largest robo-advisers ranged from $1 billion (Future Advisor, a 
subsidiary of BlackRock) to $60 billion (Vanguard Personal 
Advisor).140 A report from 2015 speculates that robo-advice platforms 
 
 135. Ji, supra note 6, at 1544. 
 136. Lightbourne, supra note 6, at 652. 
 137. Ji, supra note 6, at 1543. FINRA uses the terminology “digital investment advice 
tools” to refer to what are generally considered robo-advisers. See FIN. INDUS. 
REGULATORY AUTH., REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE 2, 9 (2016) 
[hereinafter FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE], http://www.finra.org/
sites/default/files/digital-investment-advice-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/L6N8-RW42]. 
Generally speaking, FINRA is concerned more with broker-dealers utilizing robo-advice 
in conjunction with a broker. See id. at 2. The 2016 report does recognize, however, that 
FINRA is concerned with what it calls “client-facing digital advice tools.” Id. at 9. The 
SEC has recently described robo-advisers as “innovative technologies to provide 
discretionary asset management services to their clients through online algorithmic-based 
programs.” SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 1. The Massachusetts Securities 
Division defines fully automated robo-advisers as meeting the following criteria:  
(1) do not meet with or conduct significant (or any) due diligence on a client, (2) 
provide investment advice that is minimally personalized, (3) may fail to meet the 
high standard of care that is imposed on the appropriateness of investment 
advisers’ investment decision-making, and (4) specifically decline the obligation to 
act in a client’s best interests.  
MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 5, at 3. 
 138. See Does Not Compute, ECONOMIST, Oct. 31–Nov. 6, 2015, at 69, 69–70 (stating 
that robo-advisers typically charge 0.25% or so of a client’s portfolio rather than the 1% to 
3% typically charged by human advisers). 
 139. See, e.g., Rebalancing and Tax-Loss Harvesting in Schwab Intelligent Portfolios, 
CHARLES SCHWAB, http://intelligent.schwab.com/public/intelligent/insights/whitepapers/
tax-loss-harvesting-rebalancing.html [https://perma.cc/KK9E-BKHG]. 
 140. Tom Baker & Benedict Dellaert, Regulating Robo Advice Across the Financial 
Services Industry, 103 IOWA L. REV. 713, 717 n.11 (2018). 
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will reach $489 billion in AUM by the year 2020.141 An even more 
bullish speculation puts the number at approximately $2 trillion by 
2020.142 While there may be uncertainty as to projection, it is 
universally accepted that the market for robo-advice will continue to 
rise steadily. 
Robo-advisers employ a sizeable range of business models. For 
example, “[s]ome robo-advisers provide investment advice directly to 
the client with limited, if any, direct human interaction .	.	.	.”143 Others 
provide investment advice after parameters are set with human 
advisory personnel.144 Furthermore, the methods of collecting client 
information upon which to base the investment advice differs as 
well.145 These differences in business models create a gray area that 
the SEC has yet to clarify and will confuse clients even more with 
respect to the differences between legal standards owed to them.  
B. Recent Regulatory Activity Impacting Robo-Advisers 
Regulatory scrutiny has increased over the past few years, most 
likely due to the rising sentiment in favor of greater protection of 
consumers in the financial services arena. Despite a significant lack of 
clarity surrounding the regulation of robo-advisers, one important 
detail has been definitively settled: robo-advisers are subject to the 
Advisers Act, as is any other registered investment adviser.146 
Robo-advisers have come under regulatory scrutiny at times. The 
debate surrounding the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule contained significant 
mentions of robo-advisers.147 Worried that the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule 
 
 141. Damian Fantano, Large Retail Entrants to Boost Digital Advice: Cerulli, FIN. 
TIMES: FIN. ADVISER (Nov. 12, 2015), https://www.ftadviser.com/2015/11/12/ifa-industry/
large-retail-direct-entrants-to-boost-digital-advice-cerulli-jTEYXeJa6c0pt51VG974EM/
article.html [https://perma.cc/PHJ4-RLLH]. 
 142. EPPERSON ET AL., supra note 4, at 26. 
 143. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 1. 
 144. See id. 
 145. See id. (describing how some robo-advisers utilize questionnaires of varying 
lengths to obtain information, while others may use a human adviser to obtain information 
or passively await client input). 
 146. See id. at 2; MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 5, at 4 (“[R]obo-advisers and traditional 
advisers shoulder the same fiduciary duty.”). For regulatory duties owed under the 
Advisers Act for registered investment advisers, see supra Section I.A. 
 147. See, e.g., Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., Comment Letter on Proposed Conflict of 
Interest Rule and Related Proposals, RIN-1210-AB32 (July 17, 2015), http://www.finra.org/
sites/default/files/FINRACommentLetter_DOL_07-17-15.pdf [https://perma.cc/4LGT-EXF2]. 
The Fiduciary Rule would have required all persons providing investment advice to 
qualified retirement accounts to adhere to a fiduciary standard. 29 C.F.R. §	2510.3–21 
(2018). The hotly contested rule was adopted after a significant time period. See, e.g., 
Karmel, supra note 29, at 424–25.  
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would tend to push its broker-dealers toward abandoning accounts 
that do not meet a fairly low minimum investment, FINRA 
commented that robo-advisers may not be able to act as a savior in 
that respect because “robo-advice is a poor substitute for a financial 
adviser who understands the customer’s needs and guides the 
customer through market turbulence or life events.”148 
Notwithstanding the prior statement, DOL Secretary Thomas Perez 
has praised robo-advisers as low-cost tools for those who may be 
ignored by business models that require high minimums.149 The 
Fiduciary Rule was put on hold in 2017 when President Trump issued 
a Presidential Memorandum directing the DOL “to examine the 
Fiduciary Duty Rule to determine whether it may adversely affect the 
ability of Americans to gain access to retirement information and 
financial advice.”150 The Fiduciary Rule is now laid to rest for the time 
being: the Fifth Circuit declared that the DOL overstepped its 
congressional mandate.151 
Following the decision by the Fifth Circuit to vacate the DOL’s 
attempt at imposing stricter standards on broker-dealers, the spotlight 
quickly turned to the states and whether they would attempt to do 
what the DOL could not accomplish. New Jersey was at the forefront 
of this push, becoming the first state to take action after the DOL’s 
failed attempt.152 Governor Phil Murphy stated that he was pushing 
 
 148. Fin. Indus. Regulatory Auth., supra note 147. 
 149. See Mark Schoeff Jr., DOL Secretary Perez Touts Wealthfront as Paragon of Low-
Cost, Fiduciary Advice, INVESTMENTNEWS: FIDUCIARY FOCUS (June 19, 2015, 1:24 PM), 
http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20150619/FREE/150619892/dol-secretary-perez-touts-
wealthfront-as-paragon-of-low-cost [https://perma.cc/7U34-XZ23]. 
 150. Memorandum on the Fiduciary Duty Rule, supra note 99, at 1. Governor Cuomo 
of New York recently said that New York is considering implementing its own “best 
interest” standard in the absence of the passage of the federal Fiduciary Rule. Press 
Release, N.Y. State Dep’t of Fin. Servs., Governor Cuomo Announces New Consumer 
Prots. for Life Ins. Sales (Dec. 27, 2017), https://www.dfs.ny.gov/about/press/
pr1712271.htm [https://perma.cc/P8L6-9N7R]. Cuomo notes that “[a]s Washington 
continues to ignore and roll back efforts to protect Americans, New York will continue to 
use its role as a strong regulator of the financial services and insurance industries to fight 
for consumers and help ensure a level playing field.” Id. 
 151. See Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 885 F.3d 360, 388 (5th Cir. 
2018) (“[The] DOL impermissibly bootstrapped what should have been safe harbor 
criteria into ‘backdoor regulation.’” (quoting Hearth, Patio & Barbecue Ass’n v. U.S. 
Dep’t of Energy, 706 F.3d 499, 507–08 (D.C. Cir. 2013))). 
 152. See Greg Iacurci, New Jersey Fiduciary Rule Could Be First of Many Among States 
Post-DOL, INVESTMENTNEWS: FIDUCIARYFOCUS (Sept. 26, 2018, 3:03 PM), 
https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20180926/FREE/180929933/new-jersey-fiduciary-
rule-could-be-first-of-many-among-states-post [https://perma.cc/S229-VB5S]. 
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for the new rule in order to protect the state’s investors.153 According 
to Murphy, there is a need for state regulatory action because “most 
consumers assume that financial professionals are required to give 
unbiased advice.”154 Furthermore, “most investors don’t realize 
broker-dealers often get undisclosed financial benefits for steering 
clients toward particular investments.”155 The New Jersey rule is in 
direct response to the Fifth Circuit’s quashing of the DOL’s Fiduciary 
Rule.156 The robo-advisor industry, however, is expected to push back 
against the attempt by New Jersey to institute a uniform standard of 
care.157 
The various publications released by the SEC, FINRA, and the 
Massachusetts State Securities Division—which issue warnings and 
guidance for both investors who currently do business with robo-
advisers and those who are thinking of doing business with robo-
advisers—are more directly impactful on the robo-advice industry.158 
These publications indicate skepticism among the regulatory 
community that robo-advisers may not be properly equipped to 
comply with current law. 
In 2015, the SEC and FINRA issued a joint Investor Alert 
cautioning investors to focus on understanding a robo-adviser’s terms 
and conditions, among other criteria, prior to investing.159 
 
 153. Murphy Unveils Fiduciary Duty for NJ’s Investment Brokers, U.S. NEWS & 
WORLD REP. (Sept. 17, 2018, 8:29 PM), https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/new-
jersey/articles/2018-09-17/murphy-unveils-fiduciary-duty-for-njs-investment-brokers 
[https://perma.cc/XVZ9-U6DL (dark archive)]. In accordance with Murphy’s 
announcement, the New Jersey Bureau of Securities is initiating work on the rule, which 
will require all New Jersey investment professionals “to place their clients’ interests above 
their own when recommending investments.” John Iekel, NJ to Follow Its Own Fiduciary 
Rule, ASPPA (Sept. 25, 2018), https://www.asppa.org/news/browse-topics/nj-follow-its-
own-fiduciary-rule [https://perma.cc/AB8E-LXQ8]. The state-level regulatory reforms will 
“enhance the integrity of [New Jersey’s] financial services industry by holding every 
investment professional to the highest standard under the law.” Id. 
 154. See Murphy Unveils Fiduciary Duty for NJ’s Investment Brokers, supra note 153. 
 155. Id. 
 156. See id. 
 157. See Greg Iacurci, New Jersey Brokers Expect Industry Will Push Back Against 
Fiduciary Rule Proposal, INVESTMENTNEWS: FIDUCIARYFOCUS (Sept. 27, 2018, 5:13 
PM), https://www.investmentnews.com/article/20180927/FREE/180929922/new-jersey-brokers-
expect-industry-will-push-back-against-fiduciary [https://perma.cc/4FRZ-NMUS] [hereinafter 
Iacurci, New Jersey Brokers]. 
 158. See generally MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 5 (providing guidance to investors 
regarding robo-advisors). 
 159. See Investor Alert: Automated Investment Tools, supra note 5. The Investor Alert 
cautions investors to consider five areas prior to moving forward with the relationship: (1) 
terms and conditions, (2) limitations and key assumptions, (3) recognition that the robo-
adviser is making decisions solely based on the input that was given, (4) awareness that the 
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Interestingly, the Investor Alert raised the concern that “you may 
lose the value that human judgment and oversight, or more 
personalized service, may add to the process.”160 In 2016, FINRA 
issued a report on robo-advisers entitled “Report on Digital 
Investment Advice.”161 The FINRA report ultimately seemed to 
suggest that “absent intervention by a trained professional, the 
investment advice given by a robo-adviser may be deficient.”162 
Following FINRA’s report, the SEC issued concurrent releases in 
February of 2017—one in the form of Investor Guidance and the 
other in the form of an Investor Bulletin.163 The Investor Guidance 
highlighted three specific areas that robo-advisers should pay special 
attention to when analyzing compliance with the Advisers Act: (1) 
adequate and effective disclosure, (2) collection of information to 
deliver suitable advice, and (3) effective compliance systems.164 Most 
importantly, the SEC stated in its Guidance Update that “[r]obo-
advisers, like all registered investment advisers, are subject to the 
substantive and fiduciary obligations of the Advisers Act.”165 Thus, 
robo-advisers are to be held to the fiduciary duty owed by any other 
investment adviser. 
The Massachusetts Securities Division is the only state regulator 
thus far to come out strongly in the negative as to whether robo-
advisers can live up to a fiduciary standard.166 While federal regulators 
have proceeded rather timidly and cautiously, Massachusetts stated, 
“[I]t is the position of the Division that fully automated robo-advisers, 
as currently structured, may be inherently unable to carry out the 
fiduciary obligations of a state-registered investment adviser.”167 
 
investment guidance given may not be appropriate, and (5) safeguarding of personal 
information. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. See generally FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 
137 (discussing digital investment advice). 
 162. Fein, How Are Robo-Advisors Regulated?, supra note 73, at 6. 
 163. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 1–2; Investor Bulletin: Robo-
Advisers, SEC (Feb. 23, 2017), https://www.investor.gov/additional-resources/news-alerts/
alerts-bulletins/investor-bulletin-robo-advisers [https://perma.cc/8ZHP-YGPF]. 
 164. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 2. 
 165. Id. For regulatory duties owed by registered investment advisers under the 
Advisers Act, see supra Section I.A. 
 166. See MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 5, at 8. 
 167. Id. at 1. Smaller investment advisers are governed by state regulatory agencies. 
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION §	20.5 (7th 
ed. 2017). If the adviser has less than $25 million in AUM, it must register according to the 
state’s regulatory agency’s rules. Id. If it has between $25 million and $100 million in 
AUM, the adviser must register under its state’s rules, unless greater than fifteen states 
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C. Current Debate Surrounding Robo-Advisers’ Ability to Meet the 
Fiduciary Standard 
In the past few years, industry professionals, regulatory agencies, 
and academics have “criticized the quality of robo-advice 
recommendations” and have also “indicated skepticism that robo-
advisers, as they currently exist, could ever meet the fiduciary 
standards” that the Advisers Act requires of them.168 One 
commentator believes that the arguments may be synthesized into 
three closely related propositions: (1) limitations are inherent in using 
questionnaires to gather data to base investment guidance upon, (2) 
limitations of robo-advisers as binary creatures exist as a result of a 
lack of a human element, and (3) robo-advisers lack experience in 
anything but a bull market.169 The combined message of these three 
arguments may be that humans are not ready to hand over the reins 
completely. 
The use of electronic questionnaires is a common practice with 
robo-advisers.170 Critics argue that such questionnaires have a 
tendency to miss vital information, which inevitably leads to an 
insufficiency when considering the duties owed to clients.171 The SEC 
has specifically flagged possible issues, such as the client’s lack of 
opportunity to provide context to her answers and the robo-advisers’ 
lack of ability to follow up on a line of questioning or to clarify any 
inconsistencies.172 The argument follows that these possible issues 
could then lead to a robo-adviser’s failure to consider important 
criteria such as “experience, time horizon, cash needs, and financial 
 
would require it to register, in which case it is able to register with the SEC. Id. Advisers 
with over $100 million in AUM must always register with the SEC. Id. 
 168. Ji, supra note 6, at 1545. 
 169. See id. at 1565–68. A bull market is “characterized by optimism, investor 
confidence and expectations that strong results should continue.” Bull Market, 
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bullmarket.asp [https://perma.cc/
5V2B-4N95]. By contrast, investors and analysts colloquially use “bear market” to refer to 
a downtrodden or downward-moving market. Bear Market, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bearmarket.asp [https://perma.cc/3AVV-73KY]. 
 170. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 6 (“We have observed that robo-
advisers may provide investment advice based primarily, if not solely, on client responses 
to online questionnaires.”). 
 171. Ji, supra note 6, at 1565; see also MASS. SEC. DIV., supra note 5, at 5 (“[R]obo-
advisers gather some information from prospective clients, but may not gather sufficient 
information to enable them to discharge their fiduciary duties by providing personalized 
and appropriate investment advice.”). 
 172. See SEC GUIDANCE UPDATE, supra note 5, at 6. The SEC goes on to suggest 
factors that should be taken into account by robo-advisers in an effort to gather 
information from their clients that is sufficient to meet their suitability obligation. See id. 
at 6–7. 
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goals.”173 The inability—or unwillingness, for that matter—to delve 
into the margins of an investor’s current and future situations 
provides fodder for arguments that robo-advisers are essentially an 
investment brokerage service because they do not “tak[e] into 
consideration an investor’s 360 [degree] financial picture and 
goals.”174 
The lack of “human perception” has also troubled critics.175 
FINRA has observed that the human capability of truly developing “a 
nuanced understanding of the client’s needs,” as opposed to “client-
facing digital advice tools rely[ing] on a discrete set of questions,” 
may be absent when investing with a robo-adviser.176 Furthermore, 
the problem may increase in magnitude when the tool does not allow 
one to interact with an actual person, thus completely losing the value 
of human judgment, human oversight, or more personalized service.177 
Robo-advisers may miss crucial information in relation to the original 
plan, resulting in unsound investment advice.178 
The third argument posits that robo-advisers are ill-equipped to 
handle market failures because they have never experienced anything 
but a bull market.179 This argument centers on the physical capability 
of a human adviser picking up the phone to calm down a panicked 
investor and offer a resolution.180 In times of economic turmoil, it is 
the human adviser who has the ability to talk investors through 
 
 173. Ji, supra note 6, at 1565. 
 174. Melanie Waddell, Can Robo-Advisors Really Be Fiduciaries?, THINKADVISOR 
(Nov. 30, 2015, 11:31 AM), http://www.thinkadvisor.com/2015/11/30/can-robo-advisors-
really-be-fiduciaries [https://perma.cc/B2WD-ACZA]. 
 175. See Ji, supra note 6, at 1566–67. 
 176. FINRA, REPORT ON DIGITAL INVESTMENT ADVICE, supra note 137, at 8–9. 
 177. See Investor Alert: Automated Investment Tools, supra note 5. 
 178. See Tara Siegel Bernard, The Pros and Cons of Using a Robot as an Investment 
Adviser, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/30/your-money/
the-pros-and-cons-of-using-a-robot-as-an-investment-adviser.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/
9UBF-GUJ4 (dark archive)] (discussing Professor Laby’s view that robo-advisers are not 
“fiduciaries in the traditional sense because of their inability to address subtleties that may 
arise in conversation”). 
 179. See Melanie L. Fein, Robo-Advisors: A Closer Look 5 (June 30, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2658701 
[https://perma.cc/WW9K-TW4L] [hereinafter Fein, Robo-Advisers] (stating that robo-
advisers have been in existence “only during a bull market and are untested in how they 
would perform in a downturn”). 
 180. See Robert Litan & Hal Singer, Opinion, Obama’s Big Idea for Small Savers: 
‘Robo’ Financial Advice, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2015, 7:39 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/
obamas-big-idea-for-small-savers-robo-financial-advice-1437521976 [https://perma.cc/2GC8-
D2X2] (“An email or text message in the fall of 2008 would not have sufficed to keep 
millions of panicked savers from selling, with devastating consequences for their nest 
eggs.”). 
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decisions to avoid the irrational investor phenomenon.181 Indeed, 
cutting against the heart of this argument, Vanguard Personal 
Advisor Services—Vanguard’s digital advice platform—markets itself 
as the epitome of stability for investors.182 Critics are simply 
concerned that there have been no use cases to analyze how robo-
advisers will perform in a declining market.183 
One commentator has pushed back against the popular concern 
over whether a robo-adviser can meet its fiduciary duty of care and 
concludes that “the investment adviser fiduciary duty of care is more 
lenient than robo-advisor critics recognize and that a well-designed 
robo-advisor meets the standard without issue.”184 Interestingly, it is 
the conflicts of interest, part of an adviser’s duty of loyalty, where the 
commentator believes that the bulk of concern should be placed.185 
Ultimately, it is recommended that regulators do not endeavor into 
duty of care issues but, rather, that they focus more intently on the 
conflicts of interest present in robo-adviser business models.186 
While there is certain to be more debate amongst interested 
parties as to whether robo-advisers are truly able to meet the 
fiduciary standard under the Advisers Act, the cautionary words 
given by regulatory agencies function as mere bark rather than bite. 
The regulators recognize that there may be inherent issues but are not 
ready to act. Regardless of whether a robo-adviser is deemed to fall 
short of its duty of care or duty of loyalty, the regulators have the 
option to proclaim it as not meeting its obligations as an investment 
adviser fiduciary to its clients. 
 
 181. The term “irrational investor” is used here loosely to refer to investors who 
believe that they must sell assets when the price has gone down without any significant 
change in the investment’s financials. For a more in-depth discussion, see Julia Hanna, 
Behavioral Finance—Benefiting from Irrational Investors, WORKING KNOWLEDGE (June 
6, 2007), https://hbswk.hbs.edu/item/behavioral-financebenefiting-from-irrational-investors 
[https://perma.cc/HLB9-GUUT]. 
 182. See Advice for Real Life, VANGUARD PERS. ADVISOR SERVS., 
https://investor.vanguard.com/advice/personal-advisor [https://perma.cc/7YLS-ZYTW] (“When 
it comes to investing, your natural reactions can get in the way. It’s human nature to 
overthink, overreach, and, at times, be overwhelmed. With Vanguard Personal Advisor 
Services, an advisor serves as an emotional circuit breaker so you don’t abandon a well-
thought-out plan.”). 
 183. See Ji, supra note 6, at 1567–68. 
 184. Id. at 1568. 
 185. See id. at 1579–83. 
 186. See id. 
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IV.  ROBO-ADVISERS MUST ENTER THE CONVERSATION ON A 
UNIFORM STANDARD 
Automated investment advice finds itself in the middle of the 
shuffle of the DOL’s Fiduciary Rule,187 the SEC’s renewed interest in 
public comment on a uniform standard, and the SEC’s stated 
willingness to promulgate uniform standards on its own. Robo-
advisers received ample spotlight from advocates of the DOL’s 
Fiduciary Rule as an “exemplary, low-cost investment advice service[] 
that act[s] in the best interests of clients.”188 Viewing robo-advisers in 
this light effectively results in the DOL’s blessing as a backstop for 
the potential negative consequences of the fiduciary duty being 
applied to both investment advisers and broker-dealers alike.189 This 
endorsement by the DOL has not gone unquestioned: 
During the development of the Fiduciary Rule, DOL suggested 
that “robo-advisers” will fill any gaps that result from 
constraints on commissioned advice. Robo-advisers are a 
relatively new and untested method of providing financial 
advice and are not necessarily more cost-effective than in-
person advice. No rigorous studies have examined whether a 
robo-adviser is a good substitute for a human being, especially 
in troubled markets such as the 2008 market crash.190 
Further still, the SEC, in its most recent endeavor regarding the 
differing standards of conduct, has explicitly asked for public 
 
 187. The importance of this conversation is even greater when considering the possible 
impact the DOL Fiduciary Rule could have had on low-balance retirement accounts. 
These accounts could have been too administratively expensive when it comes to 
compliance for firms, so investors would flood in large quantities to the automated advice 
market. One report has stated, “As firms move toward fee-based advisory, many low-
balance accounts will no longer be served, shifting many assets to formats such as robo-
advisory and self-directed .	.	.	.” A.T. KEARNEY, A.T. KEARNEY STUDY: THE $20 BILLION 
IMPACT OF THE NEW FIDUCIARY RULE ON THE U.S. WEALTH MANAGEMENT 
INDUSTRY 8 (2016), https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/7041991/DOL+
Perspective+-+August+2016.pdf/b2a2176b-c821-41d9-b12e-d3d2b0807d69 [https://perma.cc/
YUY9-WQPL]. 
 188. Ji, supra note 6, at 1572. 
 189. See Schoeff, supra note 149. The argument is that an increase in the standard that 
broker-dealers owe to their clients may make broker-dealers unwilling to assume the risk 
of giving investment advice where the potential payoff is not worth their while, effecting 
low-balance brokerage and retirement accounts. Id. 
 190. American Council of Life Insurers, Comment Letter on the SEC’s Request for 
Public Comments from Retail Investors and Other Interested Parties on Standards of 
Conduct for Investment Advisers and Broker-Dealers (Oct. 3, 2017), https://www.sec.gov/
comments/ia-bd-conduct-standards/cll4-2640466-161282.pdf [https://perma.cc/3T5Y-ZGSS]. 
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comments to address the rise of robo-advisers and other disruptive 
fintech.191 Specifically, Chairman Clayton asked the following: 
Market developments and advances in technology continue to 
transform the ways in which retail investors obtain advice (e.g., 
robo-advisers, fintech). How do retail investors perceive the 
duties that apply when investment advice is provided in new 
ways, or by new market entrants? Is this perception out of step 
with the actual obligations of these entities and, if so, in what 
ways? How should these market developments and advances in 
technology affect the Commission’s consideration of potential 
future actions? What steps should the Commission take, if any, 
to address potential confusion or lack of information in these 
emerging areas?192 
Conspicuously absent from this discussion is the world of legal 
academia. Due to the rise of robo-advisers and the increasing 
prevalence of regulatory scrutiny and acceptance of robo-advisers, it 
is necessary to revisit the ever-salient discussion regarding a uniform 
standard through a lens that captures robo-advisers. The 
acknowledgement that a plain definition of robo-advisers is missing 
leads to the ultimate conclusion that rules should be either adapted or 
promulgated de novo in order to specifically cater to the unique 
characteristics of how robo-advisers are used in practice. 
The following arguments highlight the need for a uniform 
standard and the inadequacies of the current regulatory regime in the 
context of robo-advisers. 
A. Investor Confusion 
As explained briefly above, the argument that investor confusion 
warrants the imposition of a uniform standard has teeth.193 Adding yet 
another entity about which investors could be confused might tip the 
scales toward justifying a uniform standard. 
Currently, it is clear that investor confusion surrounding the 
duties that investment advisers and broker-dealers owe them is a 
critical issue. Both the RAND Report and Section 913 Study 
recognize this point clearly.194 Now, robo-advisers hold themselves 
 
 191. See Clayton, supra note 9. 
 192. Id. (emphasis added). 
 193. See supra Section II.C.1.  
 194. See HUNG ET AL., supra note 15, at 20–21; SECTION 913 STUDY, supra note 15, at 
101; supra text accompanying note 108.  
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out to be an entity that may give investment advice, which further 
blurs the lines of exactly what duties are owed to their clients. 
In fact, robo-advisers often aim to minimize the fiduciary duties 
owed to their clients through the use of customer agreements with 
clauses that perform this function.195 One robo-adviser expressly 
disclaims that it has any relationship with the client, except as an 
independent contractor: 
[Robo-advisor] is and will hereafter act as an independent 
contractor and not as an employee of Client, and nothing in this 
Agreement may be interpreted or construed to create any 
employment, partnership, joint venture or other relationship 
between [Robo-advisor] and Client.196 
Other customer agreements seek to limit the fiduciary duty owed or 
seek to disown it altogether.197 This inevitably leads down the path of 
investor confusion, broadening the impact of the disparate standards 
altogether. 
B. Inconsistent Standards 
Examining the different business models that robo-advisers may 
employ adds to the inconsistent standards argument. The SEC has 
stated that robo-advisers are held to a fiduciary standard when giving 
investment advice to clients, but what about robo-advisers operating 
in the capacity of a broker-dealer? 
This key question has been overlooked thus far. It is now settled 
by the SEC that robo-advisers are generally investment advisers 
regulated under the Advisers Act, but there has been no mention 
anywhere of whether automated advice algorithms utilized by broker-
dealers are held to the same standard. Given the current law, it 
appears that robo-advisers that operate as broker-dealers—or as a 
supplement to broker-dealers—would, in fact, be governed under a 
different standard than their investment adviser brethren. 
The scenario is simple. Imagine that the same exact algorithm, 
which operates independently of all human interaction, could be used 
by a broker-dealer in conjunction with a human for the clients to call. 
The algorithm performs the investment analysis while the human 
performs the interaction, effectively functioning as a salesman. The 
idea that the same algorithm used in two different capacities—one as 
 
 195. See Fein, Robo-Advisers, supra note 179, at 24. 
 196. Id. (quoting a provision from a robo-adviser customer agreement). 
 197. See id. at 24–25. 
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a standalone registered investment adviser, and the other as a 
supplement to a broker-dealer—could be held to different legal 
standards is indicative that a uniform standard is warranted. While 
the proposition is theoretical, it is ultimately probable.  
The variance in human interaction would certainly be key when 
considering whether that robo-adviser is operating in the capacity of 
an investment adviser or a broker-dealer. This is the exact analysis 
that should spur the SEC to finally put the issue to bed and regulate 
investment advisers and broker-dealers under the same standard of 
conduct. The argument that human investment professionals who 
functionally give the same advice should be held to the same standard 
is well documented.198 The natural corollary to the argument is that 
bits of code that are exactly the same and produce the same output, 
investment advice, should be held to the same standard. 
C. Reasonable Expectations 
The advent of robo-advisers bolsters Professor Laby’s argument 
that it is actually the reasonable expectations broker-dealers confer 
upon their clients that ultimately create the fiduciary relationship.199 
As described above, a robo-adviser that acts as a broker-dealer would 
arguably create a reasonable expectation among clients that the 
digital investment advice is investment guidance that is in the client’s 
best interest. It would likely be foreign to many investors to hear that 
an algorithm has been coded to actually work against their clients in 
promoting more expensive or less strategic investing activity so that 
the ultimate owner or user of the algorithm may make more money. 
D. Proposal for Uniform Standard 
The disparity between the standard of conduct owed by a 
registered investment adviser and that owed by a broker-dealer has 
reared its head prominently over the past two decades. Robo-advisers 
must now be accounted for in the discussion. This Comment proposes 
three potential solutions, all of which have varying degrees of 
difficulty with implementation, administration, and effectiveness. 
First, states could begin to follow New Jersey’s lead and 
promulgate rules applying a fiduciary standard across the board 
within their regulatory arms that oversee securities activity.200 
However, the cost to market participants stemming from each state’s 
 
 198. See, e.g., Laby, Selling Advice and Creating Expectations, supra note 89, at 742. 
 199. See supra Section II.C.3.  
 200. See Iacurci, New Jersey Brokers, supra note 157. 
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variance in its standard of conduct could be immense. Market 
participants generally have to answer to three regulatory bodies 
already—the SEC, FINRA, and state-level regulatory agencies. There 
is a cost at each level.201 This cost further supports the salient 
argument that low-cost investment advice could be impossible to 
come by if broker-dealers are held to a fiduciary standard. In spite of 
the high cost, state-level regulation may be necessary if states strongly 
believe in protecting their citizens in this way. The SEC has had the 
opportunity to apply a fiduciary standard across the board, most 
recently in 2017, but has dropped the ball. Regulation by state 
agencies might be the unfortunate product of the SEC’s unwillingness 
to step up and handle the matter itself. 
Second, the SEC could promulgate a blanket rule. A broad rule, 
applying to all investment professionals and creating a uniform 
standard, is the easiest path to harmony within the industry. It would 
preclude states from having to do so, thus protecting firms from 
having to increase costs of compliance across the board. However, 
this option looks increasingly unlikely. The defeat of the DOL’s 
Fiduciary Rule, the unwillingness of the SEC to move forward with a 
uniform standard, and the general stance of the Trump administration 
on matters of financial industry regulation indicate that this solution 
is not likely, at least in the near future. 
Third, the SEC sticks with the status quo—differing standards 
between registered investment advisers and broker-dealers—but 
accounts for the different business models employed by robo-
advisers. The factors of investor confusion, inconsistent standards, 
and reasonable expectations all point toward a uniform standard. If, 
however, a uniform standard is not possible, the SEC could, at the 
very least, account for the proliferation of robo-advisers and the 
plethora of differences in their business models. Although the SEC 
has said that robo-advisers are investment advisers, it misses the 
difference between algorithms used as standalone investment 
professionals and those used by broker-dealers in the same capacity, 
albeit with a twinge of human interaction. The allowance of broker-
dealers to use, in theory, the same algorithm to churn out investment 
advice that is held to a lower legal standard is against the policy 
implicitly espoused by the SEC. If accounting solely for the plethora 
of business models, the SEC could use a sliding scale methodology 
that accounts for the level of human interaction and decisionmaking 
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against the interaction and decisionmaking of the algorithm. The SEC 
would then need to account for different levels of human interaction 
and decide what standard would be applied to each level. Suffice it to 
say, this would be an arduous task for the SEC. 
CONCLUSION 
Robo-advisers are still developing in many ways. The law, in 
turn, should develop with them. As robo-advisers become more and 
more ubiquitous in society, it becomes increasingly important that 
regulators follow along. This Comment argues that the conversation 
surrounding whether a uniform standard should be implemented 
across the two types of investment professionals should take heed of 
robo-advisers. The discussion should consider the impact that the 
growing automated advice market will have within those same 
parameters. In regulating robo-advice, the SEC should take into 
account not only the possibility of humans performing the same 
functions and being regulated to different degrees but also the 
possibility of algorithms performing those same functions and being 
regulated to different degrees. 
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